Cooperation is ubiquitous in nature, but explaining its existence remains a central demonstrating that spatial population expansion creates a setting where both relatedness 54 and intergroup competition are amplified, promoting the evolution of cooperation. 55
A small number of colonists initiate new subpopulations at the leading edge of the 66 propagating Fisher wave, creating a repeated series of genetic bottlenecks or "founder 67 effects" that cause stochastic loss of genetic diversity at frontiers [23, 24] . Because 68 cooperation is favored under conditions of high genetic relatedness [15] , range 69 expansions could thus in principle favor the evolution of cooperation. However, there are 70 at least three complicating factors. First, within-subpopulation selection favoring 71 defection opposes genetic demixing, potentially preventing high cooperator relatedness 72 from ever arising. Second, even with high relatedness it is not clear what selective force, 73 if any, favors cooperation over defection in expanding populations. Finally, almost any 74 genotype that stochastically fixes at the front can increase in frequency via "surfing" [6, 75 10, 24, 25]. Other genotypes that stochastically fall behind this front cannot typically 76 catch up, even if they are more fit. This is because they expand outwards in a trailing 77 allele frequency wave traveling at a speed determined by the difference in fitness 78 between defector and cooperator genotypes, (W D -W C ), which will often be much 79 smaller than mean absolute fitness. For social traits, a genotype fixed at the frontier will 80 outrun genotypes in the population interior and increase in global frequency provided that 81 (1+b)/2 > c, where b is the social and c the direct fitness effect of the leading genotype 82 (Supplemental Information). The social effect here refers to the fitness increment or 83 decrement received by an individual from social partners (e.g. the benefit of the public 84 good), while the direct effect is the fitness increment or decrement accrued to an 85 individual for engaging in a social behavior (e.g. the cost of producing the public good). 86
Note that this condition (1+b)/2 > c can be satisfied even when b < 0, and thus in 87 principle surfing may promote cooperation's opposites, selfishness and spite [26] ,including spite against relatives. Given these complications, it is not clear whether 89 spatial expansion will in fact promote the evolution of cooperation. 90
To test the effect of spatial expansion on defector/cooperator dynamics, we 91 engineered an experimental Prisoner's Dilemma game using cooperative sucrose 92 metabolism in haploid, vegetatively growing strains of the budding yeast, Saccharomyces 93
cerevisiae [27] . Yeast secrete the exo-enzyme invertase in order to digest the 94 disaccharide sucrose, which cannot easily be imported into the cell, forming 95 monosacharides that are readily imported. In our strains, sucrose cannot be imported at 96 all due to disruption of the genes mal12 and mal22 [28] . Because digestion occurs 97 externally, invertase producers ("cooperators") create a public good that is exploitable by 98 non-producers ("defectors"), who gain a relative fitness advantage by not paying the 99 fitness cost of production [27, 29] . We engineered a fluorescently marked defector strain 100 by deleting the invertase gene SUC2. 101 We note that in minimal sucrose media (YNB + 2% sucrose), competitions 102
between SUC2
+ and suc2 -strains in shaken liquid culture were previously found to 103 follow Snowdrift game dynamics [29] . In a Snowdrift game, the rare type (regardless of 104 whether it is a cooperator or a cheater) has a fitness advantage, leading to stable 105 maintenance of both cooperators and defectors [1, 30] We therefore used two approaches to construct a Prisoner's Dilemma from this 117 system. First, we eliminated the rare advantage of cooperators that is necessary for 118
Snowdrift dynamics by conducting competitions in media (YEP + 2% sucrose) in which 119 our defector strains could grow in the absence of cooperators (most likely by consuming 120 amino acids available in YEP, although growth is slower than for cooperators; Fig. 1A) . 121
This environment also eliminates the difference in colonization ability between 122 cooperator and cheater strains, as cheaters no longer require the presence of cooperators 123 to colonize the frontier (green line in Fig. 1A ). Next, we engineered a defector strain that 124 is resistant to cycloheximide, a translation-inhibiting drug that limits growth by binding 125 to ribosomal subunit cyh2. This creates a system in which we can experimentally impose 126 a tunable "cost of cooperation" by varying the level of cycloheximide in the growth 127 media. Specifically, increasing the cycloheximide concentration slows the growth of 128 cooperators but not the resistant defectors, leading to an increased "cost of cooperation." 129 When mixed with our defector strain in an unstructured environment (shaken 130 liquid culture), our cooperator strain declines at all frequencies when a cost of 131 cooperation is imposed, despite having a superior growth rate over defectors in pure 132 culture (Figs.  1,  S3 ). These results are consistent with Prisoner's Dilemma evolutionarydynamics. Unlike in a Snowdrift game, any increase in frequency of cooperators in our 134 experiments is not due to rare cooperator advantage. 135
To determine whether spatial expansion can promote cooperation in our 136 experimental Prisoner's Dilemma, we initiated spatial expansions by spotting a droplet of 137 mixed cooperator/defector cultures onto solid media (YEP + 2% sucrose + 2% agar) for a 138 range of imposed costs (see Experimental Procedures). Spatial diffusion of cells in S. 139 cerevisiae is caused when cellular growth generates an outward force leading to radial 140 spatial expansions of colonies [8] . Note that expansion is not caused by active cell 141 motility in this system as yeast lack motility. Relative frequency measurements taken 142 using flow cytometry show that cooperators initially declined in frequency at a rate 143 consistent with that of well-mixed liquid competitions, but then increased in frequency as 144 expansion proceeds (Fig. 2C) . Likewise, image analysis of fluorescently labeled colonies 145 shows low cooperator frequency near the initial site of inoculation (the "homeland"), but 146 then increasing frequency with increasing distance from the homeland (Fig. 2E ). Lattice-147 based spatial simulations of a Prisoner's Dilemma show the same spatio-temporal 148 dynamic of initial decline in cooperator frequency followed by increase as expansion 149 proceeds (Fig. 2D) . Cooperators invade when rare over a range of imposed costs (Fig. 3) . 150
Furthermore, when the benefit of cooperation is removed by competing strains on 151 glucose media, the cooperator strain no longer increases in frequency upon spatial 152 expansion (Fig. S4) . These data clearly demonstrate that spatial expansion can promote 153 the evolution of cooperation. 154
How does spatial expansion promote cooperation? Fluorescent colony images 155 reveal the formation of discrete sectors of fixed genotypes (Figs. 2A,B, 3 We note that genetic demixing (i.e. "sectoring") is particularly clear in our 167 experimental yeast system because yeast lack motility and "dispersal" of offspring is 168 local. In other systems, movement of individuals and dispersal of offspring can in 169 principle blur sector boundaries and oppose demixing at the frontier. In the extreme case 170 where movement and dispersal are very long-range, the spatial sectoring we describe here 171 will not occur, and our analysis or results will not generalize to this situation. However, 172 in real populations movement and dispersal are usually spatially restricted: a migrant is 173 more likely to disperse nearby than far away. In this case, genetic demixing will occur 174 provided that outward range expansion is sufficiently rapid compared to the rate of 175 dispersal between occupied demes across sector boundaries (i.e., perpendicular to the 176 expansion direction) [24, 25, 34] . In nature, species as diverse as rabies virus [35] and 177 humans [36] show genetic signatures of expansion-associated demixing and sectoring, 178
suggesting that the phenomenon we describe here may apply more generally. To theextent that spatial expansion-associated genetic demixing is possible in a species, the 180 mechanism we describe here promoting the evolution of cooperation will also be 181
possible. 182
Once cooperator sectors establish, their overall productivity will be higher than 183 that of defector sectors provided the fitness benefit of cooperation exceeds the cost of 184
When this is true, cooperator sectors 185 will expand radially faster than neighboring defector sectors, leading to a corresponding 186 expansion of the boundaries of the cooperator sectors at the expense of neighboring 187 defector sectors as we see in our experiements (Figs 2BE, 3) . This leads to an overall 188 increase in cooperator frequency, and suggests that range expansion creates a force of 189 natural selection favoring the "survival of the fastest." This force acts to promote 190 genotypes supporting maximal group productivity, since high productivity sectors expand 191 at a faster rate, allowing them to overtake lower productivity sectors. 192
We turn to stochastic, lattice-based spatial simulations to further test the survival 193 of the fastest hypothesis. To test whether survival of the fastest is indeed necessary for 194 range expansion to promote cooperation, we eliminate this force by restricting expansion 195 to one dimension in our spatial simulations. In one dimension, an expanding 196 subpopulation has no neighboring subpopulations to compete with so that intergroup 197 competition is absent. In this case, we find that the probability of cooperator 198 establishment at the front is never greater than the neutral probability of establishment 199 (which is equal to the initial frequency of the allele, p 0 ) and declines with increasing cost 200 (Fig. 4) . Put differently, cooperators can only outrun defectors in a one-dimensionalPrisoner's Dilemma if they randomly take over the frontier, an outcome uniformly 202 opposed by selection (Supplemental Information). 203
In contrast to the one-dimensional case, the probability of cooperators fixing at 204 the frontier is substantially higher in two dimensions, where subpopulations compete with 205 neighbors for occupancy of uncolonized habitat (Fig. 4) . Two-dimensional expansions 206 are also more efficient at purging deleterious alleles from frontiers, as seen in comparison 207 of the black and gray dashed lines in Fig. 4 . Our data support the conclusion that two-208 dimensional spatial expansions generates selection at the frontier for genotypes that 209 maximize group productivity, as these genotypes lead to the greatest expansion velocity 210 of the front, allowing cooperator enriched demes to overtake defector enriched demes. 
FIGURE LEGENDS 333

Figure 1| An experimental Prisoner's Dilemma. A) Populations composed of all 334
cooperators (red) have a higher growth rate than pure defector populations (green), but B) 335 cooperators lose to defectors within mixed populations. Growth rate in A) was assayed 336 on agar plates by measuring colony radius over time, which is directly proportional to 337 rate of cell division S. cerevisiae 
Mechanism of selection for cooperation during range expansion
The fate of cooperators during a range expansion is determined by two phases, which we will take in turn. In Phase I, stochasticity at the frontier due to serial genetic bottlenecking causes local fixation of genotypes and loss of genetic diversity. Despite being selected against within subpopulations, cooperators can nonetheless fix at the frontier if stochastic effects overwhelm purifying selection. Once genotypes fix at the frontier, the expanding wave of individuals (the "density wave") will almost always travel faster than the "allele frequency wave" (Figure  S1 ). To see this, note that in a population growing logistically with diffusion of individuals via dispersal into neighboring habitat sites, the speed of such a wave in steady-state has a known solution,
as does the speed of the traveling allele-frequency wave [1]
Figure S1| Spatial expansion in one-dimension. Population size, N, as a function of spatial coordinate, x, in a spatially expanding population. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, a mixed cooperator (red) and defector (green) front (A) will eventually resolve into a wave fixed for either cooperators (B) or defectors (C). Because cooperators lose in direct competition to defectors within each subpopulation (i.e., at each site x), outcome (B) requires that the stochastic effects of sampling at the leading edge overcome selection. However, once fixed, cooperators (or any other genotype) will outrun defectors, which advance in the trailing allele frequency wave. If defectors fix at the front (C), there is no trailing allele frequency wave because cooperators cannot invade defector subpopulations.
D is the diffusion constant, W is the mean Malthusian fitness of a subpopulation (the maximal rate of increase), and W k is the fitness of genotype k. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game we can write the fitness of cooperators and defectors as,
where W 0 is the baseline reproductive rate, b is the fitness benefit donated by cooperators, c is the loss in fitness from cooperating and p C is the frequency of cooperators in a subpopulation (we assume that subpopulations are, by definition, well mixed in terms of social interactions, so that every individual has an equal chance of interaction with any other individual, and that choice of social partners is indiscriminate). From this, we have,
where the c is positive if cooperators are fixed at the front, and negative if defectors are fixed at the front. This means that defectors can deterministically invade subpopulations fixed for cooperators ( Figure S1B ), but cooperators cannot invade defectors ( Figure   S1C ). So, we have 2 scenarios corresponding to Figures S1B,C: Figure S1B ): a) Density wave of cooperators proceeds at speed:
1) Cooperators stochastically fix at the frontier (
And is trailed by a lagging frequency wave of cheaters at speed:
c) Cooperation is stable at the front, and will contintue to gain ground and increase in global frequency if:
2) Defectors stochastically and/or deterministically fix at the frontier ( Figure S1B ): a) Density wave of defectors proceeds at speed:
b) There cannot be a lagging frequency wave of cooperators, because its speed is not a real number.
c) Cooperation is eliminated.
Because of this, cooperators can only increase in frequency in a one-dimensional range expansion if they stochastically fix at the front. Thus, there is no positive force of selection promoting cooperation in the PD in one dimension.
Importantly, this analysis has thus far been restricted to a single spatial dimension.
In reality, most range expansions will proceed along two spatial dimensions. Twodimensional range expansions can undergo Phase II: competition among neighboring subpopulations at the frontier favoring genotypes with high productivity ( Figure S2 ).
Note that within subpopulations, selection favors genotypes with the highest relative fitness, which in the case of spite and selfishness (see below) actually causes a reduction in total reproductive output as these traits sweep to fixation. This is known as the "Tragedy of the Commons". However, at the frontier, expansion speed is determined by absolute fitness, generating a force of selection promoting genotypes that increase productivity. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, equations S4a,b tell us that subpopulations fixed for cooperators will travel faster than those fixed for defectors if,
Together, Phase I (genetic demixing) and Phase II ("survival of the fastest") interact to create a force promoting high productivity strategies such as cooperation ( Figure S2 ).
However, the specific parameter regimes in which this force can overcome selection within groups favoring defectors, which is necessary for Phase I, are not immediately clear. A more detailed theoretical analysis of the interactions between density and allele frequency waves in two dimensions will be required to provide specific conditions necessary for cooperation to evolve in expanding populations, taking into account both Phase I and II; this is an interesting topic for further work.
Figure S2| Spatial expansion in two-dimensions allows selection for cooperation.
Populations expanding in two spatial dimensions, with each site at coordinate (x,y) representing a subpopulation connected to nearest neighbors by dispersal according to Kimura's stepping stone model [2] . A mixed homeland with rare cooperators will eventually demix upon expansion into subpopulations fixed for either cooperators (red) or defectors (green). Because subpopulations with cooperators expand faster than subpopulations of defectors, cooperators become enriched at the frontier by overtaking neighboring defector sectors.
Extension to other social behaviors
Spatial population expansions may influence the evolution of other social behaviors as well. Consider spite and selfishness, strategies that reduce mean population fitness, but may spread nonetheless. Spite occurs when an individual reduces its own personal fitness to harm others (b < 0, c > 0) [3, 4] . Despite counterselection within subpopulations (due to fitness cost, c), spite can nonetheless stochastically fix at the frontier of an expanding population. Once this happens, equation 4c tells us that spitefull genotypes will increase in frequency in one-dimensional populations as long as c < (1 -b)/2, which can be satisfied over a wide range of parameter space.
Selfish individuals increase their direct fitness while reducing the fitness of neighbors (b, c < 0). Selfish genotypes are more likely to fix at frontiers than non-selfish genotypes because of positive selection (direct benefit of magnitude, c), and will also establish an allele-frequency wave that will chase non-selfish genotypes that stochastically fix at the frontier.
Two-dimensional spatial expansions, however, select against both spite and selfishness. Lower productivity of spiteful and selfish subpopulations makes them vulnerable to being overtaken by neighboring subpopulations of non-spiteful or nonselfish strategies. A full exploration of this effect awaits further study.
Experimental Procedures
Strains: Strains were haploid (MATa) prototrophs with deletions of mal11 and mal12 genes, constructed from W303 background with ADH1 promoter-driven expression of the fluorescent markers ymCherry (cooperators) and ymCitrine (suc2 defectors). Cycloheximide stocks were diluted in ethanol, filter sterilized and stored at -20 C until use. Wells were inoculated with 1uL of initial culture, and 1uL was passaged from each well into fresh media every 24 hours. Plates were incubated at 30 C on an orbital plate shaker at 1000 rpm. Strain frequencies were measured using FACS at days 0, 1, 2, and 6, with 3 replicates of each condition. Range expansion competitions were conducted on 7 mL agar media (same recipe as above plus 2% agar) in 6-well culture plates. The two center wells were left empty to avoid plate effects. 1 uL of initial culture was spotted onto the center of each well and plates were incubated at 30 C, with 3 replicates of each condition. For frequency analysis, 3 replicates from each condition were chosen at random and harvested at the appropriate time point by repeatedly pipetting 2 mL PBS until colony was completely detached from the agar and well mixed, then the culture was diluted appropriately for FACS analysis. Growth rates were conducted as with the range expansions, but conducted in individual petri plates on 12 mL of agar media.
Image analysis: Image analysis was performed with Matlab. Colony radii were determined from circle fits to the colony boundary, detected using edge detection or thresholding on the brightfield image of the colony. Sector boundaries were identified by edge detection in the fluorescent images. Each sector was assigned a color by comparing its average intensity to the average intensity of its neighboring sectors. 
Simulations
A) B)
Figure S4| Range expansions in glucose media controls. A) Cooperator (red) and defector (green) strains competing in expanding colonies on glucose rich media (YEP + 2% glucose + 2% agar). The abundance of monosacharides and the absence of sucrose in the media render the coopertive phenotype, sucrose digestion, unnecessary. Thus, the benefit of cooperation is eliminated leaving only the cost of cooperation to distinguish strains. B) Image analysis of glucose controls for colonies with an initial frequency of cooperators of 0.90. Cycloheximide concentrations, from top to bottom: 0nM (dashed blue line), 75nM, 100nM and 150nM. Importantly, in these control experiments cooperators decline in frequency (from 90% in this case) when cycloheximide is applied, in contrast to the case when cooperation is beneficial in sucrose media ( Figure 2E in main text). Note that the 0nM (dashed blue) line increases in frequency slightly from 90%, indicating a slight cost to cycloheximide resistance in the cheaters in the absence of cycloheximide.
